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AlternAtive FActs, AlternAtive sciences: 
the Development oF the concept in meDievAl islAm 
AnD its historicAl consequences
Dimitri Gutas
Abstract: The perception of reality, and of what is real and what false, as unproblematic 
and self-evident in stable societies hides the fact that reality as perceived by members of 
a society is socially and politically generated. The generation through political fiat of an 
alternative reality presented as alternative facts in the unites states during the trump 
administration, and the astounding espousal of that alternative reality by nearly half of 
the population, is a striking demonstration of this fact. in this paper, the development in 
medieval islam of the concept of alternative facts as alternative scientific reality is traced to 
the historical developments in the middle east in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with 
an account of their consequences which persist to the present day.
“Alternative facts” was a phrase used by u.s. counselor to the 
president Kellyanne conway during a Meet the Press interview on 
January 22, 2017, in which she defended White house press secretary 
sean spicer’s false statement about the attendance numbers of Donald 
trump’s inauguration as president of the united states. When 
pressed during the interview with [nBc journalist] chuck todd to 
explain why spicer would “utter a provable falsehood”, conway stated 
that spicer was giving “alternative facts”. todd responded, “look, 
alternative facts are not facts. They’re falsehoods.”1 
i don’t know whether conway was aware of the broader significance of what she 
had just said, beyond its immediate purpose to justify and render true spicer’s 
* This is a redacted version of the Dimaras lecture presented at the institute of historical 
research on 4 December 2019, upon the kind invitation of its Director, Dr maria-christina 
chatziioannou, and coordinated by Dr niketas siniossoglou, for which i am deeply grate-
ful. The actual lecture itself can be viewed at https://www.blod.gr/lectures/alternative-facts-
alternative-sciences-the-development-of-the-concept-in-medieval-islam-and-its-historical-
consequences/. The entire and lengthy text of my argument with full documentation can be 
read in my article “Avicenna and After: The Development of paraphilosophy. A history of 
science Approach,” in islamic philosophy from the 12th to the 14th century, ed. Abdelkader 
Al Ghouz (Göttingen: v&r unipress/Bonn university press, 2018), 19–71. i have accord-
ingly kept the references in this version to the complementary minimum.
1 Wikipedia contributors, “Alternative facts,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Alternative_facts&oldid=987270064 (accessed 9 november 2020). 
The Historical Review / La Revue Historique
section of neohellenic research / institute of historical research
volume Xvii (2020)
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false statement, but it became patently clear to me, after a moment of puzzlement 
at the illogicality of the response, that she had expressed in a nutshell that the 
perception of reality, facts and logic aside, is socially and politically generated. 
This is even more obvious especially now, after four more years of a stream 
of alternative facts presented by president trump, that their acceptance rate 
as reality has reached 40 percent of the American public and elevated him to 
the status of a cult figure.2 Aristotle’s insightful statement that man is a social 
animal (ζῷον πολιτικόν) was not specifically referring to the social construction 
of reality, but it is just as true in this respect also. There is a reality out there 
without humans, but it is knowable when a human being perceives it, in which 
case his perception of reality is his reality. And his perception is directed, coached 
and coloured by the dominant world view and outlook on life that is current, 
adopted or imposed in his society. if this is a historical truism, it is extraordinary 
that we witness its coming into play, through sheer political fiat, in real time and 
in slow motion in our society.
From this vantage point it could be seen that the history of science – and 
perhaps more broadly, the history of civilisation – consists of the conflict for 
dominance and acceptance as the reality among alternative facts. in a traditional 
society in which a mythological view of reality is dominant, at one point 
alternative facts about some aspects of it are presented by some individuals 
whom we may call scientists engaged in rational investigation of reality. These 
alternative, scientific facts may or may not be accepted by society, depending 
on whether this alternative vision of reality they describe impinges negatively 
on some group’s or class’s interests. An example from trump’s America would 
be climate change, established and verified by the overwhelming majority of the 
world’s scientists, which is not accepted as fact by the administration, promoting 
the interests of the fossil fuel industry. And so it goes, alternative fact after 
alternative fact. some of the scientific facts eventually get universally accepted as 
reality – the earth is not flat and our solar system is not geocentric, after all – but 
this is a very gradual progress, achieved after protracted social struggles and with 
many backtrackings. The vested interests in the maintenance of a traditional or 
mythological perception of reality have strong political control of the direction 
of a society and are not easily countered or eliminated. in most, if not all, of the 
cases, when it is not feasible to reject scientific facts outright, they are opposed 
2 The incredible and unnatural denial of self-preservation exhibited by trump’s follow-
ers facing certain infection with covid-19 as they thronged, unprotected, in mass rallies 
upon his summons, bears resemblance to the same denial by the followers of the American 
preacher Jim Jones when they ingested poison-laced punch upon his orders in a mass sui-
cide in Jonestown, Guyana, on 18 november 1978. 
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by means of discursive strategies that declare them dangerous or subversive 
and render them suppositious and hypothetical rather than absolute facts; they 
are allowed a shadowy or ambiguous existence but not to be actually operative 
in the society concerned. A pertinent example is precisely such discursive 
tactics used by the catholic church to disqualify from reality the heliocentric 
theory of copernicus and Galileo. in an unsigned preface to copernicus’s De 
revolutionibus, the theologian Andreas osiander wrote:
to say that the supposition of a moving earth and a stationary sun 
saves the phenomena … is apt indeed and in no way dangerous – and 
that’s enough for mathematics. But to claim that the sun is in reality 
the centre of the universe … that is very dangerous, not only as an 
irritant to the scholastic philosophers and theologians but also because 
it undermines holy Faith by imputing error to sacred scripture.3 
The alternative scientific fact was relegated to the realm of supposition, 
whereas the mythological reality of the church maintained itself, with its 
imposition on the population, for quite some time longer until it was no more 
viable. 
such developments can be traced throughout history in societies around the 
world, and their specific study allows for a deeper understanding of the historical 
process and the causes that direct societies on particular paths by determining 
what they know as reality, and influence the advancement of science. in this 
essay i wish to have a closer look at the emergence of alternative mythological 
facts as reality, and eventually as alternative sciences, in medieval islam, and 
the discursive tactics that were used to maintain their dominance over society. 
The immediate backdrop to the rise and development of a scientific outlook 
on reality in the islamic world is the hellenic scientific tradition. it developed 
in classical Greece out of the traditional mythological view of reality as a result 
of the efforts by generations of scientists to discover, argue for and establish 
scientific facts.4 in this process, it set itself up not in antagonism towards it 
3 in Galileo Galilei, Le opera di Galileo Galilei, ed. Antonio Favaro (Florence: G. Bar-
bara, 1902), 12:171–72, cited by carlo Ginzburg, “machiavelli, Galileo and the censors,” 
New Left Review 123 (2020): 98, emphasis added. 
4 For the purposes of this discussion there is no need to raise the issue of what science is 
in different times and different societies; the common, dictionary understanding of the term 
will suffice. i will be also referring to what we call thinkers, philosophers and scientists in an-
tiquity and the middle Ages merely as scientists. The distinction between a philosopher and 
a scientist is a modern concept that does not apply to premodern times. A philosopher was 
the person who conducted rational and open-ended investigation into reality, and treated 
all the subjects, from metaphysics to physics, psychology, zoology, ethics and politics and 
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but perhaps initially as complementary to, and eventually as inclusive of, the 
traditional, mythological and religious view, treating it as a phenomenon to be 
explicated allegorically or in some other way. Thus, although it did represent 
a radical shift in outlook – from mythos to logos – it did not create a rupture in 
hellenic epistemological consciousness, as the traditional beliefs accommodated 
to and interwove themselves with it. The hellenic view and the discourse that 
expressed it became dominant in the hellenistic age after Alexander the Great 
(323–30 Bc), and beyond into the first christian centuries, not only in the Greek-
speaking world but also in the eastern mediterranean and the near east. it spread 
among the educated elites without noteworthy resistance from traditional forms 
of belief and the proponents of the Greco-roman mythological world view. This 
is true even for the non-Greek-speaking populations in these areas, whose elite, 
educated in Greek, participated in scientific activities in Greek. 
The emergence of christianity as a social force and the official religion of 
the roman empire in the fourth century proclaimed and championed the 
mythological approach to reality in a form more vehement than anything that 
hellenic traditional forms of belief could produce. The defining characteristic 
of late antiquity, certainly from the viewpoint of the outlook on reality and 
accordingly the history of science, was the conflict between hellenism and 
christianity, what was regarded as facts by the one and by the other. The ensuing 
defeat of the former, brought about by sheer political pressure that was exerted 
by social, administrative and violent means, constructed an alternative reality. 
truth, or true facts, was no longer what was discovered at the end of open-
ended inquiry into reality by rational, logical and mathematical means, but what 
was encoded and asserted to have been revealed once and for all in a book, the 
alternative facts of the mythological narrative of the Bible. nevertheless, despite 
the eclipse of the hellenic scientific outlook in the Greek-speaking population 
in the eastern roman empire, the foothold that it had gained in the allophone 
societies in the near east resulted in the translation of the scientific literature, 
however partially, into syriac and middle persian, thereby acknowledging its 
international validity. 
islam arose in the seventh century within this context. As the new kids on 
the international block, it was advantageous to the muslim rulers, especially 
after the Abbasid dynasty came into power following the revolution in 750, to 
adopt the body of knowledge of their time, hellenic science. For many reasons 
literature, etc. This was the understanding of philosophy, and self-understanding of phi-
losophers, in antiquity and the middle Ages.
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that i have discussed elsewhere, the scientific literature was translated.5 Among 
these reasons, i could briefly cite primarily the development of a climate of 
rationalism among the elites that was both politically advantageous and 
conducive to scientific research, something that was not the case with the roman 
orthodox across the islamic frontier, and to a lesser extent with the christian 
syriac communities inside it, but was rather akin to what we can estimate to have 
been the climate fostered by the last sasanian emperors of persia. 
on its basis it was possible and politically feasible for the muslim scientists 
under the early Abbasids to engage in scientific research; the mythological 
narrative of islam at that point was not brought into play at the level of 
confrontation with scientific reality – if anything, its foremost doctrinal position, 
the oneness of Allah, was seen to be demonstrated rationally in the two welcomed 
disciplines of metaphysics and physics. The attitude to scientific research and 
its methodology are clearly expressed in this passage by the great scientist 
and theorist of optics ibn-al-haytham (d. after 1040), in a book in which he 
delineates his objections to some of the theories of ptolemy, the authoritative 
ancient astronomer:
The seeker after the truth is … not he who studies the writings of 
the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in 
them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions 
what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and 
demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature 
is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and deficiency. it is thus the 
duty of the man who studies the writings of scientists, if learning the 
truth is his goal, to make himself an adversary of all that he reads, and, 
applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from 
every side. he should also suspect himself as he performs his critical 
examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or 
leniency. if he follows this path the truths will be revealed to him, and 
whatever shortcomings or uncertainties may exist in the discourse of 
those who came before him will become manifest.6
Avicenna (d. 1037) represents the culmination of this approach. he improved 
and corrected the hellenic science in many areas, adopted an empiricist 
approach to knowledge and completely accommodated religion to scientific 
5 Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Move-
ment in Baghdad and Early ’Abbasaid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th Centuries) (london: 
routledge, 1998).
6 in the introduction to his Doubts on Ptolemy, translated by A.i. sabra, The Optics 
of Ibn al-Haytham: Books I–III. On Direct Vision (london: Warburg institute, 1989), 2:3.
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truth by explaining it, and not merely explaining it away, in symbolic and 
allegorical terms. he made no concessions whatsoever to the islamic 
mythological narrative, explaining everything by constant reference to 
scientific positions in natural science. Avicenna᾿s achievement in historical 
terms is that he presented an entire, integrated, self-consistent and rational 
view of all reality, based on the science of his day and his own research, which 
incorporated and explained, but also respected, religions, revelation and the 
islamic tradition. This is what made it immensely successful and irresistible, 
but at the same time it potentially set itself up, and eventually was set up by 
others having specific political agendas, as the opposite and contradictory 
world view to that presented by the islamic mythological narrative. 
soon after Avicenna’s death, the political situation in central iraq became 
precarious as the Fatimid (anti-) caliphs in cairo, who belonged to the ismaili 
branch of shiism, had gained strength and were set to advance to Baghdad, the 
seat of the sunni caliphate, and capture the caliph. The incoming of the turkic 
seljuks into mesopotamia at the time, and the support of the caliphate by some 
of their factions, averted the immediate danger, but the ismailis had infiltrated 
the area and continued to present a serious threat to the caliphate through low-
level (asymmetrical, as we would say today) warfare and political assassinations, 
notably of the vizier of the seljuks, nizamulmulk, in 1092. (The term assassin 
of course comes from the name given to these very ismailis in syria, Arabic 
ḥaššāšīn, hashish users.)
The ismaili shiite version of islam consisted of an elaborate amalgam of 
islamic tenets with neoplatonic theories of cosmology and psychology aiming 
“at establishing a harmony between the quran and the late antique interpretation 
of plato and Aristotle”.7 From the very beginning of the Fatimid state in egypt, 
the ismailis sought to advance their cause by sending missionaries to the sunni 
world to propagate their specific brand of islam and gain adherents. They 
penetrated the entire muslim world and had reached central Asia; Avicenna 
himself reports in his autobiography that an ismaili missionary had visited their 
home in Bukhara when he was a child and was discussing with his father and 
older brother about the soul and the intellect (though he records that even at 
that early age he would not accept their views). The ismailis were using religious 
ideology as their main weapon, and so the Baghdad caliphate countered their 
ideological and, by the end of the eleventh century, political threat by establishing 
in unwavering terms the sunni principles of islam. This consisted in the 
7 Daniel De smet, “ismaili Thinkers of the 4th/10th and the early 5th/11th century,” 
in Philosophy in the Islamic World, ed. ulrich rudolph, rotraud hansberger and peter 
Adamson (leiden: Brill, 2017), 1:737.
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affirmation of the literal validity of the quran and the prophetic tradition and 
condemnation of scientific ideas that could be used in their interpretation, as 
the ismailis were presented as doing. in the process, the scientists were equated 
with the ismailis, and some of their views, as synthesised by Avicenna, were 
anathematised as heretical. in other words, the mythological narrative of the 
quran was imposed as alternative facts to scientific facts.
This constituted the major ideological conflict in islamic societies in the 
east after Avicenna, and the ensuing intellectual history is largely a record 
of the ways in which this conflict played itself out. The contest in the various 
reactions to Avicenna was between the defence of the scientific view of reality 
as presented in his work, on the one hand, and the attempts against science 
aiming to rehabilitate, endorse and enforce the literal validity of the quranic 
mythological narrative, on the other. These antiscientific endeavours and the 
positions they took evolved and developed gradually over the following few 
centuries and were pursued with impressive sophistication and expertise. The 
most significant of them are the following.
The very first and most important antiscientific step that was taken by all 
reactionary factions was in the epistemological domain. it aimed to reject the 
primacy, indeed the unique relevance, of reason in science, and postulate, or 
rather assert as fact, an extra- or suprarational means of acquiring knowledge 
that was variously described as illumination, inspiration, “unveiling” or “tasting” 
of the truth, etc. 
The second grievous antiscientific development after Avicenna was in the 
social and legal domain, with the criminalisation of heterodox thought, which 
was defined as unbelief and accorded the legal status of apostasy (zandaqa), 
punishable by death under certain circumstances.
The third major antiscientific development was that the Avicennan corpus 
of science pertaining to metaphysics and some of the physics, now subject 
to suprarational methods of analysis and treated with the theological aim of 
accommodating sunni islamic doctrine, was reformulated, repackaged and 
regurgitated in a new genre of writing. This process took some time to reach 
maturity, and it also took a variety of forms, the motor driving it being the 
altered discursive strategy of making religion the arbiter of science at both the 
intellectual and legal plane; its principal intention was to argue in favour of sunni 
islamic doctrine in scientific terms, to countermand the presumed scientifically 
argued ismaili islamic doctrine. it was thus not like the traditional theology 
which had its own methods, procedures and technical terminology that it did 
not try to pass off as science; the new genre of writing did. But then neither was 
it science, in that it violated all the basic principles of what doing science had 
meant historically, which was the open-ended rational investigation of all reality. 
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it was not open-ended, in that it strove to argue for one predetermined thesis, the 
islamic mythological narrative; it was not completely rational, in that it admitted 
selectively suprarational modes of acquisition of knowledge; and it was not an 
investigation of all reality in that it narrowed the discussion to certain subjects, 
those of interest to religious doctrine (essentially, metaphysics, cosmology and 
psychology). For this reason i suggested that we call this sort of clandestine 
theologising that simulates and presents itself as philosophy or science as 
“paraphilosophy”, and understand the term to mean “doing what appears to be 
philosophy/science in order to divert attention from, subvert and substitute for 
philosophy/science, and as a result avoid doing philosophy/science”. 
What the new name of this discipline and discursive strategy is intended to 
emphasise is the fact that they were different from anything that had preceded. 
This was recognised and remarked upon by the muslim scholars themselves, who 
called the new discipline “islamic philosophy” or science. Thus beyond the issue 
of its mere appellation, what is significant about the acknowledgment of the new 
discipline with a new name is that it indicates a shift in cultural attitudes towards 
scientific knowledge, in that it was now possible to view it as exclusively Islamic 
scientific knowledge as opposed to the scientific knowledge of others. in the 
terms of our discussion, the alternative facts imposed by the islamic mythological 
narrative were now organised to form an alternative science. 
This development parallels the emergence of Islamic medicine in the form 
of “prophetic medicine” (watered down snippets pilfered from Avicenna’s 
Canon of Medicine and presented with a heavy dose of quranic and prophetic 
dicta), and the development of Islamic astronomy as anti-hellenic astronomy. 
Thus, before these developments, which had begun by the twelfth century, 
science was understood to be common to all humanity (which, in any case, 
was the very rationale used by muslim scholars for the translations and the 
importation of “foreign” science into Arabic), while the variations from the 
mythological narrative of islam were either explained (away) in metaphorical 
and allegorical terms, or disregarded as belonging to two distinct and disparate 
spheres of human and social experience, and hence not in mutual conflict. But 
by the twelfth century the process was set into motion which culminated in 
the creation of paraphilosophy, in which the two disparate spheres were joined 
so that an alternative science was created which belonged not to all humanity 
but to muslims alone: “islamic” philosophy, “prophetic” medicine, “islamic” 
astronomy. The purpose then of paraphilosophy is seen certainly to make 
science, or Avicenna’s scientific system and world view, acceptable to muslims by 
sanitising it, but also to create this alternative islamic science.The consequences 
of these developments were momentous. most significantly, the emergence of 
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paraphilosophy as islamic science and its supplanting of rational science meant 
the end of research-based investigations and understanding of reality. This 
also led to the fragmentation of the scientific disciplines that were cognitively 
unified; the various sciences – from physics to biology to mathematics and 
astronomy – were atomised and independently pursued without their theoretical 
basis in a unified scientific world view. paraphilosophy restricted itself mainly 
to theological subjects, God, the universe and man’s relation to it; logic was 
dissociated from the rest of the sciences and was cultivated as a discipline 
unto itself; astronomy, dissociated from an overall physical and cosmological 
context, became a jostling of models and numbers to account for the position and 
movements of the planets; medicine was socially sidestepped by the appearance 
and proliferation of manuals on “prophetic medicine”; zoology was reduced 
to accounts of the “marvels of creation”, and ethics and politics continued as 
practical advice books in various “mirrors for princes”.
The antirationalist outlook eventually opened the gates to the development of 
mystical, fantastic and illusionary intellectual constructs, each presenting itself 
as true philosophy and a confirmed scientific system, adopting the terminology 
and discourse of science. ibn-Arabi’s mysticism, elevated to a comprehensive 
world view by his eminent disciple sadraddin qunawi, became as prominent 
and respectable as science and theology. other systems of asserted knowledge 
like lettrism, geomancy and astrology provided authoritative and predictive 
interpretations of all reality, both metaphysical and political, and were embraced 
by the rulers after the fourteenth century. Whatever scientific research may 
have been conducted in the various disciplines in isolation from each other, as 
mentioned, did not yield results to have noticeable effects.
With colonialism in the nineteenth century, the islamic world view came 
in earnest contact with the post-enlightenment european one. What this 
means in terms of our discussion here is that the european scientific facts now 
came, as alternative facts themselves this time, into conflict with the facts of the 
islamic world view since the twelfth century. The nature of the reactions to this 
confrontation in the islamic world, indissolubly linked with and determined 
by the political developments in each country, ranged over the entire spectrum. 
some countries (and also factions within countries) adopted the european world 
view fully (called “modernisation” and “Westernisation”), not only with regard 
to the sciences, up to and including evolution, but also secularism and secular 
social and political institutions as well, as in the republic of turkey. others 
have tried to reach a compromise between the two and harmonise selectively 
modernism with tradition in their beliefs and social institutions, as in egypt. 
Yet others have rejected modernisation and adhered to tradition, attempting 
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to generate islamic sciences to mirror the european ones: the hard sciences 
were necessarily accepted, but the humanities and social sciences were rejected 
and replaced by their corresponding “islamic” ones. Theorising the social 
sciences especially has been vigorously pursued in efforts to create an islamic 
social theory; in the islamic republic of iran there has been continuous work to 
generate such fields as islamic anthropology.8 
We are still in the middle of this process of competing alternative facts in 
the islamic world – which ones to adopt, how to form the perception of which 
reality. But precisely because this process is in progress and highly variable, as 
it is experienced to be in the trump era in the united states, it is possible to see 
indeed in how many ways reality is socially constructed.
Yale University
8 Alireza Doostdar, “varieties of islamic social science,” Know 2 (2018): 229–47. For 
an overview of these developments in the islamic world, see Anke von Kügelgen and peter 
Adamson, “195 – Anke von Kügelgen on contemporary islamic Thought,” history of 
philosophy Without Any Gaps podcast, 26 october 2014, https://historyofphilosophy.net/
contemporary-islam-von-kugelgen.
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